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ZCCM Investment Holdings Plc v Konkola Copper Mines Plc and Vedanta Resources 
Holdings Ltd 2019/HP/0761 
Sangwani Patrick Ng’ambi1 
Facts 
In November 2004, the Government of the Republic of Zambia had concluded an agreement 
in which Vedanta Resources Holdings Limited (“Vedanta”), acquired a majority shareholding 
interest in Konkola Copper Mines (“KCM”). Following this acquisition, ZCCM Investment 
Holdings Plc (“ZCCM-IH”) negotiated and executed a Shareholders Agreement and Articles 
of Association. Among other things, the aforementioned agreements provided that Vedanta 
would be responsible for appointing the Chief Executive Officer, who in turn was responsible 
for appointing a Chief Operating Officer, Chief Financial Officer and other senior 
management. 
 
In the petition filed by ZCCM-IH it was alleged that Vedanta had managed KCM in a manner 
that was detrimental to the interests of ZCCM-IH. Among other things it was alleged that: 
 
• Vedanta had only declared dividends five times in the fifteen years amounting to a total 
of USD 67.105 Million. Furthermore, Vedanta had failed to pay ZCCM-H the sum of 
USD 10,305,000.00 which was the latter’s share of the dividend, despite the fact that 
it was declared in 2013; 
• Vedanta had operated at a loss for the preceding seven years. Cumulatively these losses 
amounted to USD 1.2623 billion; 
• Vedanta was not able to meet its operating costs between 2013 and 2019; 
• The company was failing to pay its debts. For example, it owed Copperbelt Energy 
Corporation Plc the sum of USD 24,064,722 and Ndola Lime sums of USD 468,036.25 
and ZMW 199,941;  
• That Vedanta had been operating in a manner that was not environmentally friendly or 
sustainable. They had polluted and continued to pollute water sources in and around 
the mining licence areas. Consequently, they were found liable for polluting the Kafue 
River by the Supreme Court of Zambia under Appeal No. 1 of 2012;  
• They had provided a mining plan pursuant to section 35(1)(b) of the Mines and 
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Minerals Development Act, 2015 and failed to abide by it. For example, they had failed 
to develop the mining areas in Chingola and Chililabombwe and to carry out mining 
operations with due diligence. This meant that they continued to operate below 
capacity. Failure to adhere to the requirements of the Mines and Minerals Development 
Act, meant that the Ministry of Mines issued a default notice against Vedanta.  
 
It is against this backdrop that on 21st May 2019, ZCCM-IH applied to the Lusaka High Court 
of Zambia to have KCM placed in provisional liquidation. Vedanta applied for a stay in these 
liquidation proceedings because the Shareholders’ Agreement between the Government of 
Zambia and Vedanta, contained within it an arbitration clause.2 Under this arbitration clause, 
all disputes arising out of the Shareholders’ Agreement were to be settled by arbitration. The 
term ‘dispute’ was defined quite broadly in the Shareholders’ Agreement.3 Vedanta contended 
that since ZCCM-IH felt that KCM was being managed in a manner that was detrimental, there 
was a dispute between the parties as per the Shareholders Agreement, and therefore it should 
be referred to arbitration.4 
 
Counsel for Vedanta contended that since there was an arbitration clause, the Court was 
compelled to stay the liquidation proceedings and accordingly refer the matter to arbitration, 
by virtue of section 10 of the Arbitration Act of 2000.5 This is because section 10 of the 
Arbitration Act was couched in mandatory terms. The aforementioned provision says that: 
 
(1) A court before which legal proceedings are brought in a matter which is the subject of an 
arbitration agreement shall, if a party so requests at any stage of the proceedings and 
notwithstanding any written law, stay those proceedings and refer the parties to arbitration unless it 
finds that the agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.  
(2) Where proceedings referred to in subsection (1) have been brought, arbitral proceedings may 
nevertheless be commenced or continued, and an award may be made, while the issue is pending 
before the court.  
 
In advancing their argument, counsel for Vedanta relied on the case of Konkola Copper Mines 
v NFC Africa Mining (2006), under which the Supreme Court held that where there is an 
arbitration clause and a party applies for a stay of proceedings under section 10 of the 
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Arbitration Act, the Court has no choice but to refer a matter to arbitration. The only exception 
to this rule is if the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of 
performance.  
 
The High Court disagreed. In their view this was not a proper case to refer the parties to 
arbitration. As far as the High Court was concerned, the arbitration agreement was “null and 
void, inoperative or incapable of being performed”. The court acknowledged that section 10 
was couched in mandatory terms.6 However, it noted that this same section also provided that 
the Court should refuse to stay proceedings in the event that it finds that the arbitration clause 
is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed.7  
 
The Court held that it had exclusive jurisdiction to oversee the liquidation proceedings. The 
ultimate aim of such proceedings was to protect third parties.8 Included in the category of third 
parties are the creditors of a company which is to be wound up. The High Court noted that 
creditors had already filed their Notices of Intention to be heard in the winding-up petition. 
Thus, despite the fact that there was a dispute between the parties to the Shareholders’ 
Agreement, the Court had a duty to consider the interests of third parties, in the matter before 
it.  
 
The High Court opined that where third party rights were involved in liquidation proceedings, 
“the private agreement between shareholders and a company to submit their dispute to 
arbitration is displaced and rendered inoperative.”9 This is owing to the fact that the other 
competing interests are completely separate from the interests of the parties to the arbitration 
process. The former thus supersedes the latter because it can only be taken care of through the 
court process.10  
 
In addition to this, the Court was of the view that the arbitration agreement itself did not apply 
to the creditors, whose Notice of Intention to be heard was already before the court.11 Given 
this fact, the arbitration agreement was inapplicable. As such, the High Court dismissed the 
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application to stay the liquidation proceedings.12  
 
Significance 
This case is significant because these very facts were presented to the South African High Court 
and had a totally different outcome. The South African proceedings in Vedanta Resources 
Holdings Ltd v ZCCM Investment Holdings Plc and Milingo N.O. Lungu (In his official 
representative capacity as the Provisional Liquidator of Konkola Copper Mines PLC)13 had 
been decided by the High Court of South Africa a few weeks earlier. This case concerned the 
liquidation proceedings in the Zambian High Court. In this instance, Vedanta sought to restrain 
ZCCM Investment Holdings (the first respondent) from taking any further steps in furthering 
the winding-up proceedings.  
 
As with the case before the Zambian High Court, one of the issues in contention before the 
South African High Court was the arbitration clause in the Shareholders’ Agreement.14 The 
parties had actually selected Johannesburg as the seat of the arbitration proceedings.15 The 
issue here was whether there was a “dispute” between the parties. The Court looked at the 
definition of dispute contained in the Shareholders’ Agreement and found that it was couched 
in very wide terms, which connotes that it was the intention of the parties to extend rather than 
limit the definition of “dispute”.16 They particularly focused on the usage of terms such as, 
“dispute, disagreement, controversy, claim or difference” meant that in an event that the parties 
do not adopt the same position or view on an issue, then there is in fact an arbitrable dispute.17  
 
The South African High Court held that liquidation proceedings initiated before the Zambian 
High Court, amount to a dispute. Therefore, this matter is subject to arbitration as contemplated 
in the Shareholders’ Agreement. Furthermore, since Johannesburg was the seat of the 
arbitration, the South African High Court had jurisdiction as a supervisory court.18 For this 
reason, the South African High Court held inter alia that the respondents must litigate its 
disputes by arbitration in Johannesburg. As such, they were prevented from instituting any 
further winding-up proceedings, until a final determination was rendered by an arbitral 
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The fact that there was an arbitration clause, connotes that the parties intended the dispute to 
be settled in a neutral forum, outside the mechanisms of national law. Having the dispute heard 
before a court in the national jurisdiction may have not only led to years of litigation but also 
would have given ZCCM-IH the home-turf advantage.20 This is further underscored by the fact 
that Johannesburg was chosen as the seat of the arbitration. This would suggest that it was 
within the realm of contemplation of the parties, that in the event that a dispute arises, then it 
would be settled by arbitration in Johannesburg.  
 
Furthermore, the author agrees with the South African High Court, when it asserts that the term 
dispute was couched in very broad terms. It said that “dispute” means “any dispute, 
disagreement, controversy, claim or difference of whatsoever nature arising under, out of, in 
connection with or relating (in any manner whatsoever) to this Agreement or the interpretation 
or performance of this Agreement or the breach, termination or validity thereof.” From this, it 
is conceived that the meaning of “dispute” is very wide, rather than very narrow. As such, any 
dispute arising, under, out of, in connection with or relating to this matter would fall within the 
scope of this contractual provision. This would include the liquidation.  
 
Furthermore, section 10 of the Zambian Arbitration Act is couched in mandatory terms.21 As 
a general rule, this means that the Court must compel the parties to go to arbitration, in the 
event that there is an arbitration clause. In other words, Courts must decline to hear a dispute 
in the event that there is a written arbitration agreement, if one party so requests.  
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The exception under Zambian law, appears to be that the Court will accept jurisdiction over a 
matter in the event that the arbitration clause is null, void, inoperative or incapable of being 
performed. The decision of the Zambian court hinges on the fact that since there are third party 
interests to protect, the Court had jurisdiction over the matter and the arbitration clause was 
displaced and rendered inoperative. What is unclear is the connection between the interests of 
third parties in a liquidation and the inoperability of the arbitration clause. To strengthen its 
contribution to existing jurisprudence, this should have been made more explicit, thereby 
enriching the current discourse among scholars in International Commercial Arbitration.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
